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For Release at 9:30 a.m. EST
Tuesday, March 19, 2002
STATEMENT OF THE HON. CHARLES A. BOWSHER
CHAIRMAN, PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
BEFORE THE SENATE BANKING COMMITTEE
MARCH 19, 2002
Thank you Mr. Chairman. My name is Charles Bowsher and since late 1999, I have been chairman of the Public
Oversight Board, which was created in 1977 to oversee the voluntary self-regulatory program of the
accounting profession. I am pleased to be here today to discuss our observations about recent problems in
regulation of the accounting profession, to offer our recommendations for reform, and to discuss the decision
of the POB in January to terminate its existence as of March 31 of this year.
I am joined today by Aulana L. Peters, a member of the POB, a retired partner in the law firm of Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher and a former commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and by Alan B. Levenson,
a senior partner at Fulbright & Jaworski, who is counsel to the POB and former director of the SECs Division of
Corporation Finance.
The accounting world as it exists today is the outgrowth of a long series of steps taken by Congress, the
securities industry, and the major accounting firms over many years since the bleak days of the 1929 stock
market crash and the Great Depression that followed in the 1930s.
After the market crash in 1929, Congress enacted a series of reforms that laid the foundation for the system
we know today. Chief among them was the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which included the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission; the
requirement that corporations that sell stock to the public register with the SEC; and that public companies
undergo an annual independent audit of their financial statements. The system created in the early 1930s
survived for more than 40 years with only minor adjustments.
In the 1970s, however, it was revealed in hearings before the late Senator Frank Churchs Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations that some companies had paid bribes to foreign officials to win business and that
these payments had been kept secret from auditors and the public. In the aftermath of these revelations,
Congress - under the leadership of this committee - passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 to make
clear that bribery of foreign officials by American firms is unacceptable.
Another event affecting the accounting profession in the 1970s was the bankruptcy of the Penn Central
Railroad - the largest bankruptcy since the 1930s and the Enron failure of its day.

In the wake of the sensitive payments scandal, the Penn Central collapse, and audit failures, the late Senator
Lee Metcalf of Montana in 1977 chaired a series of hearings to determine whether new federal regulation of
the accounting profession might be appropriate. In response to these hearings, and as an alternative to
legislation, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), in consultation with the SEC and
with the support of the nations leading accounting firms, created a self-regulatory framework for the
profession. To enhance the quality of audits of financial statements of public corporations, peer review was
instituted as the cornerstone of the self-regulatory program.
To run the new self-regulatory programs, including peer review, the AICPA created the SEC Practice Section
(SECPS), composed of firms that audit the financial statements of public corporations. And to oversee the
programs of the SECPS, the independent Public Oversight Board (POB) was created in 1977. Its function is to
protect the public interest. Specifically, the POB was created to monitor and comment on matters that affect
public confidence in the integrity of the audit process.
I believe peer review - where one accounting firm hires another to review its operations and internal controls resulted in major improvements. The recommendations that flowed from peer reviews in the early days led to
substantive improvements in the quality controls at accounting firms, large and small.
However, even though the new self-regulatory programs were innovative for their time, they were created
with some concern and caution.
John C. Burton, a distinguished professor of accounting at Columbia University and the chief accountant at the
SEC when reforms were being made in 1977, warned in testimony before the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee in 1978, that peer review is likely to be seen as a process of mutual back scratching. He
also warned that it is highly doubtful that a part-time group [POB] can either in fact or perception provide an
effective substitute for statutory regulation.
Harold M. Williams, who was chairman of the SEC at the time of the reforms in the late 1970s, warned in a
speech in January 1978, that the effectiveness and credibility of the Public Oversight Board depends on its
independence, including its willingness to be critical when called for and its ability to make public its
conclusions, recommendations, and criticisms. Chairman Williams also made the point that an effective POB
could only be effective if it is not impeded in performing its functions and responsibilities.
Now, a quarter century after the reforms of the late 1970s, I believe events of recent months demonstrate
that the warnings of Dr. Burton and Chairman Williams have come to pass. Ive come to the conclusion that the
voluntary self-regulatory program needs to be replaced because it has failed to keep pace with challenges
faced by the profession. More troubling is the resistance of the professions trade association, the AICPA, and

several of the Big 5 firms to major reform.
Arthur Levitt, the former SEC chairman, also described this problem in recent testimony before the Senate
Banking Committee. More than three decades ago, he said, Leonard Spacek, a visionary accounting industry
leader, stated that the profession couldnt survive as a group, obtaining the confidence of the publicunless as a
profession we have a workable plan of self-regulation. Yet, all along the profession has resisted meaningful
oversight.
In 1980, the SEC said in a report prepared for the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs that the POB
has an obligation to serve as the conscience and critic of the self-regulatory effort. The POBs charter provides
that the POB is to represent the public interest on all matters that may affect public confidence in the integrity,
reliability and credibility of the audit process.
Despite our attempts to serve the public interest and be the conscience and critic, the POB has been impeded
since I became chairman in its ability to oversee the profession. Three events are noteworthy in how the POB
has been frustrated in its ability for effectively carry out its responsibilities to serve the public interest:






On May 3, 2000, SECPS took the unprecedented step of notifying the POB that it would refuse to pay
for special reviews of public accounting firms. The special reviews in question had been sought by the
SEC to determine whether the firms had complied with SEC and professional independence standards.
The decision of the SECPS to deny funding to the POB was a serious blow to the notion of independent
oversight of the accounting profession. Melvin Laird, the former Congressman and Secretary of Defense
and the longest-serving member of the POB, said that this was the worst incident in my 17 years on
the POB.
Following the decision to cut off funding of the POBs special reviews requested by the SEC, the largest
accounting firms the Big 5 agreed with the SEC that the POB should instead conduct more limited
independence reviews of the large firms. Despite this agreement, the next 21 months were marked by
a series of delaying tactics. Because of this lack of progress, the POB, in the end, was unable to
conduct the reviews.
For years, the POB had carried out its oversight responsibilities under a set of bylaws adopted after it
was created in 1977. The POB felt that a formal charter would improve the independence of the Board,
and a charter was one of the primary recommendations in August 2000 of the Panel on Audit
Effectiveness, which was created by the POB at the request of the SEC. However, objections from the
AICPA and the Big 5 caused negotiations to drag on for more than a year. Ultimately, a new charter
took effect in February 2001.

The recommendations of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, including a formal charter for the POB, were

designed to improve the existing voluntary self-regulatory system, not to create a new regulatory structure for
the profession. At the time of the panels recommendations in August 2000, neither the POB nor members of
the panel thought it was likely that Congress would approve a statutory self-regulatory organization to govern
the profession.
These three events and the frustration they created were among the factors that led the POB to decide, on
January 20 of this year, to terminate its existence. But the precipitating event was the announcement by the
Chairman of the SEC, Harvey Pitt, of a proposed new regulatory structure for the accounting profession. This
plan was worked out in private talks between the SEC and the AICPA and the Big 5 accounting firms with no
input from the POB, which had repeatedly been assured that it would be consulted.
The new proposal effectively rendered the POB a lame duck. The POB believed it could not oversee the
activities of the accounting profession under the circumstances and that it would mislead the public to appear
to do so. Furthermore, the POB was concerned that were it to continue in operation during an interim period
before a new governance structure was in place, it would leave the impression that it approved of the Pitt
proposal, which it did not. As conscience and critic, the POB felt it had no choice but to disband. Only by so
acting, we felt, could we protect the public interest. What the POB did was akin to what an auditor does when
it believes it must resign from a client engagement because of a fundamental disagreement.
Attached to my testimony, Mr. Chairman, are copies of the letters I sent as chairman to Mr. Pitt on January 21
and January 31, 2002, detailing the POBs decision to terminate. These letters are attached as Appendices A
and B. I would also ask that a letter to the SEC dated March 5, 2002, urging that an independent person be
named to conduct the independence reviews which the POB was unable to complete, be made a part of the
record.
Mr. Chairman, the current system of self-regulation of the accounting profession has significant problems.
First, the funding of the POB is subject to control by the firms through the SECPS. In the past - as noted above
- the SECPS has cut off that funding in an effort to restrict POB activities. In addition, the AICPA and SECPS
insisted on a cap on POB funding when the new charter was created.
Second, the disciplinary system is not timely or effective. Disciplinary proceedings are deferred while litigation
or regulatory proceedings are in process. This results in years of delay and sanctions have not been
meaningful. The Professional Ethics Division of the AICPA, which handles disciplinary matters against
individuals, does not have adequate public representation on its Board. Investigations by the Quality Control
Inquiry Committee of the SECPS, which handles allegations of improprieties against member firms related to
audits of SEC clients, do not normally include access to firm work papers and firm personnel involved in the
engagements under investigation. The disciplinary system cannot issue subpoenas or compel testimony - it

must rely on the cooperation of the individual being investigated - and cannot talk to the plaintiff or the client
company involved. Furthermore, there is no privilege or confidentiality protection for investigations or
disciplinary proceedings, and disciplinary actions are often not made public.
Another problem is that monitoring of firms accounting and auditing practices by the peer review process has
come to be viewed as ineffective, and has been described as clubby and back-scratching. The peer review
team does not examine the work of audits that are under investigation or in litigation, and public peer review
reports are not informative.
Other problems include the fact that the current governance structure does not have the weight of a
Congressional mandate behind it. There is a perceived lack of candid and timely public reporting of why and
how highly publicized audit failures and fraud occurred, and what actions have or will be taken to assure that
such problems do not recur.
Mr. Chairman, the Public Oversight Board strongly believes that a new regulatory structure for the accounting
profession is essential. However, we believe that to be effective, it must be totally independent of the
accounting profession and it must be based on the foundation of congressional action creating a statutory selfregulatory organization.
The Board recommends that Congress create a new Independent Institute of Accountancy - the IIA - and
center all regulation under its auspices. A seven-member board would run the Institute totally independent of
the AICPA, the Big 5, and other firms. The chair and vice chair would be full time employees of the Institute;
five other members would serve on a part time basis. All would be appointed by a panel composed of the chair
of the SEC, the chair of the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury. Once named, the chair
of the IIA would join these three in naming other members of the board. Members of the IIA board could be
removed only by a two-thirds vote of the board itself.
The SEC would have oversight of the IIA, and the SECs Office of the Chief Accountant would be the liaison to
the IIA. Attached as Appendix C is a chart showing the organization of the IIA.
Important functions of the Institute would include:




The IIA would exercise oversight for all standard setting for accounting, auditing, and independence,
and their interpretation. Accounting standards are just as important as auditing and independence
standards. For this reason, the POB believes the Financial Accounting Standards Board must be brought
under the umbrella of the IIA, which would take responsibility for its oversight and funding.
Firm-on-firm peer review would be discontinued for firms that audit more than 100 public corporations
each year. In its place, IIA employees would conduct thorough and comprehensive yearly reviews of








the annual internal inspections of such firms. Unlike peer review, no activities of a firm would be off
limits to Institute reviewers and the process would produce detailed public reports. For firms that audit
less than 100 public corporations yearly, reviews would be performed by other firms selected by the
IIA. Their reports would be addressed to the IIA as the client of the reviewer. In addition to the
reviews, IIA employees would conduct special reviews, when warranted. Similar to those the SEC
originally asked the POB to undertake, these reviews could take a systemic, in-depth look at a firms
systems, policies, procedures, and operations. If necessary, such special reviews would delve into
questions affecting the firms compliance with applicable professional standards. As with the yearly
reviews, reports of these special reviews would be public.
An Office of Enforcement and Discipline within the IIA would have full authority to investigate
allegations of wrongdoing by public accounting firms and their personnel. The POB recommends giving
the IIA the privilege of confidentiality as well as the power of subpoena to compel testimony and
produce documents. Cases of alleged misconduct would be brought before IIA hearing examiners.
When warranted, these examiners would recommend to the IIA board the imposition of sanctions,
ranging from fines to expulsion from the profession. Cases could be referred to the Justice Department
for possible prosecution, or to the SEC, state boards of accountancy, or other agencies, as appropriate.
Funding would be provided through fees imposed on public corporations in amounts sufficient to cover
the costs of the Institute. The POB strongly believes that the funding mechanism must be beyond the
reach of the profession to prevent it from withholding necessary funds, as it did in May of 2000.
The IIA would be charged with coordinating international liaison and overseeing continued professional
education for those in the profession.
Beyond these functions, the POB recommends that:
With regard to non-audit services for audit clients, the POB recognizes that there has been
disagreement on restricting scope of services and that various models have been suggested for what
should be allowed and what should be excluded.
The POB strongly agrees with a point made in President Bushs 10-point reform plan that Investors
should have complete confidence in the independence and integrity of companies auditors. The specifics
on the Presidents plan recognize the importance of prohibiting certain non-audit services in order to
safeguard auditor independence.
The POB takes note of a statement issued by the AICPA on February 1, 2002, in which it affirmed that
it will not oppose federal legislation restricting the scope of services that accountants may provide their
public audit clients, specifically in information technology and internal audit design and implementation.
Against this background, the POB proposes that SEC regulations concerning independence be
legislatively codified with appropriate revisions to update restrictions on scope of services involving

information technology and internal audit services as noted above. At the same time, the POB believes
such legislation should affirm that tax work not involving advocacy and attest work by audit firms in
connection with SEC registration and other SEC filings be allowed. The POB also believes that small
public businesses, to be defined by the SEC, should not be subject to any restriction on non-audit
services for audit clients. Further, with respect to non-public corporations, it is the POBs position that
such corporations and the accounting firms that audit them should not be subject to any restriction on
non-audit services. We expressly emphasize this to avoid misunderstanding and any consequences to
small business and small audit firms.










The IIA Office of Standards should be empowered by legislation to promulgate appropriate rules
affecting independence to cover changing circumstances. The POB believes there should be no
prohibition against an audit firm offering non-audit services to non-audit clients.
Auditors should be rotated every seven years. As a corollary, public corporations would be prohibited
from firing auditors during their term of service unless such action is determined by the audit
committee to be in the best interest of shareholders, with prompt notice to the IIA and the SEC.
Such action would be required to be publicly disclosed by corporations in current reports and proxy
statements filed with the SEC. Engagement and other partners who are associated with an audit should
be prohibited from taking employment with the affected firm until a two-year cooling off period has
expired.
The Institute should expand on the recommendations of the recent Blue Ribbon Committee which made
it clear that the external auditor should be accountable to a firms board of directors and its audit
committee and not to management. Specifically, the audit committee should take full responsibility for
hiring, evaluating, and - if necessary - terminating an audit firm.
To discourage conflicts of interest involving public corporations, Congress should amend the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to require more meaningful and timely disclosure of related party transactions
among officers, directors, or other affiliated persons and the public corporation. Such disclosures should
be made promptly in current reports as well as in proxy statements filed with the SEC.
Management of public corporations should be required to prepare an annual statement of compliance
with internal controls to be filed with the SEC. The corporations chief financial officer and chief
executive officer should sign this attestation and the auditor should review it. An auditors review and
report on the effectiveness of internal controls would - as the General Accounting Office (GAO) found in
a 1996 report - improve the auditors ability to provide more relevant and timely assurances on the
quality of data beyond that contained in traditional financial statements and disclosures. Both the POB
and the AICPA supported the recommendation when the GAO made it, but the SEC did not adopt it.

The POB feels these reforms are necessary if trust is to be restored in the accounting profession. The Board
has presented what it believes is a sensible, workable plan for reform. It is premised on the firmly held belief
that the fundamental purpose of regulation is to serve the public interest and that of investors. If this is to be

accomplished, regulation must be totally independent of the profession, it must pull together all aspects of
regulation from standards to discipline, it must be transparent, and it must provide for adequate funding and
staff.
A decade ago this committee was in the forefront of enacting major reforms for the banking industry - reforms
that were widely opposed by the banks and their lobbyists. Opponents then predicted gloom and doom for the
industry should the proposed reforms be enacted. In reality, the reforms contained in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 repaired flaws in regulation of the nations banking industry.
More important, they significantly strengthened the industry.
Today the Congress again is called upon to institute reform. In the wake of the Enron debacle, the POB, acting
as the conscience and critic of the profession, strongly believes that to protect investors and the public, the old
system of voluntary self-regulation for the accounting industry must be replaced. While many will urge that
Congress act with caution and that the profession be again given the opportunity to fix the present system
with marginal changes, the POB believes it is time to resist the continuation of the status quo and move ahead
with fundamental change.
Mr. Chairman, you recently made the point that recent events have had a critical impact on the national
confidence in the financial markets and that the time has come to focus on the protection of investors and the
efficient functioning of our capital markets. I could not agree more. That is why I believe it is time to resist
continuation of the status quo and move ahead with fundamental change.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have.

